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ABSTRACT
I use the psychological phenomenon of ‘attribute framing’ as a case study for
exploring philosophical conceptions of semantics and the semantics-
pragmatics divide. Attribute frames are pairs of sentences that use
contradictory expressions to predicate the same property of an individual or
object. Despite their equivalence, pairs of attribute frames have been
observed to induce systematic variability in hearers’ responses. One
explanation of such framing effects appeals to the distinct ‘reference point
information’ conveyed by alternative frames. Although this information is
taken to be pragmatic, a live debate in the philosophy of language concerns
the extent to which pragmatic information can really be held apart from
semantics. Therefore, in this article I examine whether – and how – reference
point information might be thought to intrude on the semantics of an
attribute frame. I describe two ways in which the information might be
considered broadly semantic, due to its being directly communicated or
conventional. However, I argue that the framing data in fact support a
narrower conception of semantics, and a semantics-pragmatics distinction that
separates standing sentence meaning from enriched communicated meaning.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 31 October 2019; Accepted 2 June 2020
KEYWORDS Attribute framing; framing effects; semantics; pragmatics; communication; convention
1. Introduction
In this article I use the psychological phenomenon of ‘attribute framing’ as
a case study for exploring philosophical conceptions of semantics, and the
semantics-pragmatics divide. Attribute framing involves predicating the
same property of an entity through the use of contradictory expressions
in the predicate. For example, a basketball player might be described as
having ‘made 60%’ of his shots or, equivalently, as having ‘missed 40%’.
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Intuitively, the first way of framing the information makes the basketball
player sound much better, and this is borne out in empirical studies (as
will be discussed in §2). In order to explain the systematically different
effects of speakers’ framing choices on hearers’ judgements, it has been
argued that alternative frames pragmatically convey distinct information
(specifically, distinct ‘reference point information’, as will be discussed in
§3). The question I address here is whether that information can sensibly
be held apart from the frames’ semantics. An ongoing debate in the phil-
osophy of language concerns the scope of semantics and the location of
the semantics-pragmatics divide; specifically, to what extent can meanings
that are standardly treated as ‘semantic’ be insulated from pragmatic
effects? Various stances adopted in this debate call for a re-examination
of the reference point information conveyed by alternative frames. I will
argue that, although it could be classified as semantic information, it
shouldn’t; that would obscure the distinction we need in order to
explain framing effects. As such, the case study of attribute framing sup-
ports a relatively minimal conception of semantics.
The structure of the discussion is as follows: in §2 I describe the puzzle
presented by attribute framing effects. In §3 I set out an ostensibly prag-
matic solution that has been developed in the psychological literature –
the ‘reference point hypothesis’. In §§4–6 I assess whether – and how –
the ‘reference point information’ posited by this account might be
thought to intrude on the semantic meaning of an attribute frame.1
Specifically, in §4 I reject the idea that reference point information could
be traced back to a sentence’s standing meaning; in §5 I consider how
reference point information might be thought to freely affect what is
directly communicated by a particular uttered frame; and in §6 I consider
whether that information could be conventional, without necessarily con-
tributing to truth-conditional content. I accept that, in principle, the refer-
ence point information conveyed by attribute frames could potentially be
classified as broadly semantic, in one or other of the two senses con-
sidered. However, I conclude in §7 by arguing that neither of these ‘expan-
sive’ semantic treatments can be motivated by the framing phenomena
themselves, which instead require us to distinguish between the standing
meanings of frames and the reference point information they tend to
convey when uttered. On the contrary, then, the case study of attribute
1I assume throughout that it makes sense to talk about semantic meaning (and not just speaker meaning).
However, I will remain neutral on the question of whether semantic meanings always (or ever) constitute
complete, truth-evaluable propositions (for further discussion, see: [Bach 2001, 2006; Borg 2012; Fisher
2019; Harris, forthcoming]).
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framing gives us a pro tanto reason for conceiving of semantics relatively
minimally: it invites us to draw the semantics-pragmatics boundary
between uttered sentences’ standing meanings, on the one hand, and
their further enriched communicated meanings on the other.
2. Attribute framing
Attribute frames are pairs of sentences that predicate the same property of
an individual or object whilst using contradictory expressions in the predi-
cate. Take for example, the following pair of sentences, used to describe a
basketball player:
(1) The player made 60% of his shots.
(2) The player missed 40% of his shots.
The verb phrases ‘made his shots’ and ‘missed his shots’ are contradic-
tory, since shots are either missed or made (with no third possibility).
However, because the degree modifiers ‘60%’ and ‘40%’ are complemen-
tary (summing to 100%) the predicates end up being logically equivalent
overall.2 Under either frame, then, the player’s performance can be rep-
resented as being located at the same point on the scale below. As we
move from left to right along this scale, an increase in the proportion of
shots made entails a corresponding reduction in the proportion of shots
missed (and vice versa as we move from right to left) (Figure 1).
Despite the logical equivalence of the frames, the player intuitively
sounds better when described using the first frame rather than the
second.3 Experimental data confirm that a player is typically judged more
valuable to a team when he is described using frame (1) than when he is
described using frame (2) (Leong et al. 2017). The variability of participants’
evaluative judgements in this case exemplifies the ‘attribute framing effect’
(Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998), which I define as follows:4
2Unless, of course, the number expressions are semantically lower-bounded, such that ‘60%’means at least
60% while 40% means at least 40%. Although Mandel (2014) presents evidence that framing effects
depend on lower-bounded interpretations of number expressions, other psychologists have failed to
confirm his results (including Chick, Reyna, and Corbin 2016). I suggest that this factor is unlikely to
explain the attribute framing effect in its entirety (even if it does so in part). Therefore, in order to
focus on the unexplained portion of the effect, I will proceed as if the number expressions are semanti-
cally bilateral (so that 60% means ‘exactly 60%’ and 40% means ‘exactly 40%’).
3Indeed, this feeling can persist even once the frames are recognised to be equivalent. This leads Tversky
and Kahneman (1986, 260) to write: ‘In the persistence of their appeal, framing effects resemble visual
illusions more than computational errors’.
4Since the current discussion is limited to attribute framing, I leave aside classic ‘risky choice’ framing para-
digms of the kind initially investigated by Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986). I also leave aside the
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Attribute framing effect: A systematic shift in hearers’ judgements,
brought about by the speaker’s use of one or other of a pair of attribute
frames (even while all aspects of the wider context are held constant).
Myriad psychological studies have revealed attribute framing effects
(for a survey, see (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998); some later studies
are discussed below). On the face of it, such effects present a puzzle:
why do we respond in systematically different ways to frames that predi-
cate exactly the same property of an entity? Various solutions to this
puzzle have been put forward in the psychological literature. Here I
focus on the ‘information leakage’ account, according to which the speak-
er’s choice of attribute frame conveys some additional contextual infor-
mation (Leong et al. 2017; McKenzie and Nelson 2003; Sher and
McKenzie 2006, 2008, 2011).5
3. Reference points
McKenzie and others have proposed that, by using one or other of a pair of
contradictory expressions, the speaker of an attribute frame indicates that
the subject of predication possesses the corresponding property to a rela-
tively high degree.6 In their own words:
McKenzie and Nelson (2003) hypothesized the following regularity in linguistic
behavior: (1) In describing a fixed state of proportionate affairs, speakers are
more likely to describe the proportion in terms of “X1” when X1 has increased
relative to the reference point proportion (the norm, or what one would have
expected) than when X1 has decreased relative to the reference point. (2)
Figure 1. Shots made/missed.
‘goal framing’ paradigms discussed by Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998). Although I believe the argu-
ments I put forward may extend to those paradigms too, this is not something I will try to show here.
5Although I cannot argue for this fully here, I consider the information leakage account to be more attrac-
tive than its main competitor, the associationist account put forward by Levin and others (Levin 1987;
Levin and Gaeth 1988; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998). Whereas the associationist account only
extends to pairs of frames with opposing positive or negative valence, the information leakage
account can also capture the effects of evaluatively neutral frames.
6In fact, according to the more general version of their account, the speaker indicates merely that the
property is salient in some respect. Sometimes this is because it is possessed to a relatively high
degree (as per the reference point hypothesis); other times, it is suggested, the speaker may be convey-
ing an ‘implicit recommendation’. I will focus on the reference point hypothesis here, since I consider it
to have the strongest theoretical and empirical basis. In principle, though, my argument could be
extended to a more general, or pluralistic, version of the information leakage account.
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Listeners are sensitive to this regularity—that is, listeners are capable of correctly
inferring the reference point proportion from the speaker’s choice of proportion-
frame. (Sher and McKenzie 2006, 471)7
To illustrate, it is helpful to run through one of the experiments reported
by McKenzie and Nelson (2003). In this experiment participants were
found to make systematically different judgements about the prior con-
tents of a glass, based on how its current contents were described – in
terms of the proportion ‘full’ or ‘empty’. Below is an example vignette,
which was presented to participants in one of six experimental conditions:
Imagine that Mary was sitting at her kitchen table with a glass in front of her. She
left the room briefly and came back to find that the contents of the glass had
changed. When asked to describe the glass now, Mary said, “The glass is half
full.” Given how Mary chose to describe the glass after its contents had
changed, please choose the statement below in terms of what you think was
most likely true about the glass before its contents changed.
Participants were then given the following options:
The glass was full before its contents changed.
The glass was empty before its contents changed.
In two other experimental conditions, the degree modifier used by
Mary was ‘a quarter’ or ‘three quarters’ rather than ‘half’. Each of these
‘full’ framing conditions was mirrored by a condition in which Mary used
the contrary adjective, ‘empty’, with a complementary degree modifier.
All six conditions (a-f) are presented on the scale below (Figure 2).8
Within each pair of frames (a and b, c and d, e and f) both frames
describe the same current content of the glass. Nevertheless, it was
found that participants made systematically different judgements about
the prior content of the glass, depending on whether Mary used a ‘full’
or ‘empty’ frame. Specifically, participants in conditions a and c (where
Mary used ‘full’ frames) were more likely to say the glass was previously
7The formulation here implies a temporal component, describing the proportion as having increased rela-
tive to a reference point. However, in other studies, there is no temporal relation between the reference
point and the subject of predication. For example, in the study by Leong et al. (2017) the reference point
is taken to be an average, or typical, individual. Therefore, I prefer to formulate the hypothesis in tem-
porally neutral terms.
8Note that, according to one prominent analysis of gradable adjectives, ‘full’ and ‘empty’ are absolute
gradable adjectives with ‘closed’ scales, i.e. scales with fixed endpoints (Kennedy and McNally 2005).
Therefore, the glass’s being ‘full’ simpliciter means that it contains water to a maximal degree, while
its being ‘empty’ simpliciter means that water is absent from the glass to a maximal degree. Once
‘full’ and ‘empty’ are combined with complementary degree modifiers, however, they map to points
along a scale, such that any increase in fullness entails an equal reduction in emptiness (and vice
versa), similarly to the pair of predicates considered earlier.
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empty than participants in conditions b and d (where Mary used ‘empty’
frames). The difference between conditions c and f was not statistically sig-
nificant, although the trend was in the same direction (Table 1).9
The reference point hypothesis is able to capture the data: when Mary
uses an attribute frame like (3):
(3) The glass is half full.
the audience infers something like the information in (3a), which I will call
the ‘reference point information’:
(3a) The glass is relatively full.10
Conversely, when Mary uses the alternative frame:
(4) The glass is half empty.
the audience infers the following reference point information:
(4a) The glass is relatively empty.
I take it that the salient reference point in McKenzie and Nelson’s exper-
imental scenario is the prior state of the glass.11 Taking account of this,
we can posit the following, more specific, versions of the reference
point information:
(3b) The glass is fuller than before.
(4b) The glass is emptier than before.
Figure 2. Full/empty framing conditions.
9These findings concerning ‘full’ and ‘empty’ frames are further corroborated by experiments reported by
Sher and McKenzie (2006) and Ingram, Hand, and Moxey (2014). The data from each of these studies
suggest that ‘empty’ frames conveyed reference point information more strongly than ‘full’ frames.
This is likely to be due to ‘empty’ being generally ‘marked’. For further discussion of the concept of mark-
edness, see (Lehrer 1985). For current purposes I set this issue aside.
10Strictly speaking, the informational content should be: ‘The speaker believes that the glass is relatively
full’. However, for ease of exposition, I will assume that the hearer (taking the speaker’s belief to be
reliable) infers the further content that the glass is relatively full.
11In general, though, salient reference points need not always be prior states. In other scenarios a range of
other entities could fulfil that role. I will not say much here about what makes an entity suitably salient,
although I think this could plausibly depend on a wide range of factors, including: the discourse context;
the nature of the subject of predication; and, perhaps, subjective factors of the kind discussed by Ver-
heyen, Dewil, and Égré (2018).
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It should be noted that the reference point information specified in (3b)
and (4b) need not be inferred by hearers absolutely but merely assigned
greater probability, given the speaker’s choice of frame. Thus, when a
speaker uses (3), hearers tend to treat the situation described by (3b) as
being more probable than they would have done had the speaker used
(4). (And, conversely, a speaker’s use of (4) leads hearers to assign
greater probability to the situation described by (4b) than they would
have done had the speaker used (3)).12 For ease of exposition, I will
ignore this subtlety and proceed as though hearers inferred (3b) and
(4b) absolutely. However, nothing in the argument hangs on this simplifi-
cation. Indeed, in §§6–7 I will suggest that the probabilistic nature of the
reference point information adds further weight to my claim that refer-
ence point information is pragmatic rather than semantic.
Simplifying a little, then, the alternative frames (3) and (4) can be under-
stood as establishing diametrically opposed relations between the glass
and the reference point. They do so because the expressions ‘full’ and
‘empty’ lie at opposite ends of the scale.13 Thus, under frame (3) the refer-
ence point lies in the region represented by R1 in Figure 3 below, whereas
under frame (4) the reference point lies in the region R2:14
This would explain why McKenzie and Nelson’s experimental partici-
pants were more likely to think the glass was previously empty when Mary
used a ‘full’ frame than when she used an ‘empty’ frame: Mary’s use of
the ‘full’ frame indicates that the glass is now fuller than before, whereas
her use of the ‘empty’ frame indicates that it is now emptier than before.15
Table 1. Full/empty framing effects.
Mary’s frame % participants saying the glass was full before
(a) ¼ full 35%
(b) ¾ empty 94%
(c) ½ full 50%
(d) ½ empty 80%
(e) ¾ full 56%
(f) ¼ empty 79%
12For an explicit formulation in terms of Bayesian conditional probabilities, see (Sher and McKenzie 2008,
2011).
13Geurts (2013) makes a similar observation about scale reversal in cases of framing but provides a
different explanation of the shifts in hearers’ judgements. Although I cannot assess his alternative
account here, I note that it is less powerful than the reference point hypothesis in the sense that it
applies only to frames with positive or negative valence, not to those which are evaluatively neutral.
14It is not entirely clear, then, why the experimenters used maximal reference points (i.e. the glass being
completely full or completely empty before) rather than mere relative states (i.e. the glass being fuller or
emptier before). Nevertheless, their results still succeed in demonstrating the relevant effect, as
described next.
15McKenzie and Nelson present complementary evidence that speakers are sensitive to the same reference
point information when choosing whether to use one frame or the other. Their data suggest that, when
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We are now in a position to extend the reference point hypothesis to
the example of the basketball player, to explain why he should be
judged more valuable to a team when his performance is described in
terms of shots ‘made’ rather than ‘missed’. According to the reference
point hypothesis, frame (1) tends to carry the following reference point
information:
(1a) The player made a relatively large proportion of his shots.
whereas (2) tends to carry the reference point information in (2a):
(2a) The player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots.
Under frame (1), then, the player is understood to have performed rela-
tively well compared to the reference point (let’s assume this is the
average, or typical, player in the relevant domain). In contrast, under
frame (2) he is understood to have performed relatively badly. Therefore,
he is evaluated more favourably under (1) than under (2).16 Note that
while both frames are still taken to convey the same information about
the player himself, they shift our assumptions about the reference
point’s location on the scale, so that the player’s performance ends up
seeming better or worse by comparison.17 Stated generally, the same
subject can seem better under one frame than another just in virtue of
being evaluated relative to quantitatively distinct alternatives.
Further support for the reference point hypothesis comes from a series
of other experimental studies, deploying various different pairs of frames
Figure 3. Full/empty reference point information.
inferring reference point information, hearers are reliably tracking speakers’ beliefs. This may give us
some reason to analyse reference point information as being genuinely communicated (rather than
merely a downstream ‘perlocutionary’ effect of the utterance, in Austin’s sense [Austin 1975]).
Clearly, though, the question of whether reference point information is pragmatically communicated,
and not just inferable, is one which merits further discussion. Here I will simply assume that it is a prag-
matic effect, as the proponents of the reference point hypothesis do, and focus on showing why it
should not be considered to intrude on semantics.
16Leong et al. (2017) present empirical evidence that reference point information is, in fact, playing the
hypothesised causal role in this particular framing effect.
17An implication is that, where audiences already hold independent information about the reference
point, they may be less susceptible to framing effects. The second experiment reported by Leong
et al. (2017) suggests that this is indeed the case.
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(Honda and Yamagishi 2017; McKenzie and Nelson 2003; Sher and McKen-
zie 2006; Teigen and Karevold 2005). In what follows, I will assume that the
reference point hypothesis accounts for at least some portion of the attri-
bute framing effect. I characterise the hypothesis as follows:
Reference point hypothesis: In virtue of their including one of two contra-
dictory predicate expressions, attribute frames tend to convey that the
subject of predication instantiates the property corresponding to that
expression to a high degree, relative to the most salient reference point.
Sher & McKenzie have explicitly described their information leakage
account as ‘pragmatic’, concerning as it does ‘the ways in which speakers
typically select utterances and convey meaning in human conversational
environments’ (Sher and McKenzie 2008, 83).18 For some, this might
already imply that reference point information cannot be classified as
semantic. However, a live debate in the philosophy of language concerns
the ‘intrusion’ of pragmatic effects on meanings traditionally classed as
semantic. Stretching back over the last half a century, as exemplified in
thework of Lewis, Kaplan, and Stalnaker (amongothers), semantics has con-
cerned itself with the truth-conditional contents speakers express when
they utter sentences. However, many have argued that such contents will
often (perhaps always) depend on a variety of extra-linguistic factors tra-
ditionally classified as pragmatic; these include, for example, relations to
entities in the wider context of utterance, or facts about speakers’ commu-
nicative intentions. It is clear how such arguments are immediately appli-
cable to a class of expressions like ‘I’, ‘today’ and ‘this’, which refer to
different entities on different occasions of use. More radically, similar argu-
ments havebeen extended to all kinds of other expressions that are usedby
speakers to say different things on different occasions (Bach 1994; Carston
2002; Recanati 2004, 2010; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Travis 2008).
Meanwhile, some theorists have sought to expand the scope of seman-
tics in another direction, to include all kinds of conventional effects on
meaning (as will be discussed in §6). In light of this ongoing conceptual
debate, it is necessary to consider whether we should think of reference
point information as intruding in some way on the semantic contents of
18However, they remain neutral about the pragmatic mechanism at work:
Note that the present analysis makes no assumptions about the existence of Gricean norms, or,
more generally, about the communication of informative intent… The analysis simply points
out that, when a certain kind of regularity in speaking behavior exists, a particular kind of infer-
ence will typically be warranted, norms and intentions aside. Whether and how listeners, in
drawing such inferences, consider informative intentions or conversational norms is a question
for further research to address. (Sher and McKenzie 2006, 470, n. 3)
In fact, I believe a broadly Gricean analysis may well be possible; but this is a topic for another day.
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attribute frames; this will be the topic of the next three sections. Ulti-
mately, though, I will argue that we should not, and that the case study




An expression’s standing meaning can be thought of as the meaning it
possesses purely as a matter of linguistic convention. For example, the
standing meaning of the noun ‘glass’ may be thought of as a function
mapping that expression to the set of all things that are glasses; and the
standing meaning of the adjective ‘full’ can be thought of as a function
mapping the expression to the set of full entities. I take it that any
theory which recognises semantic meaning at all will classify simple
expressions’ standing meanings as being semantic. Slightly more contro-
versially, the standing meaning of a complex expression, like a sentence,
can be thought of as a function of the standing meanings of its constitu-
ents, together with their manner of combination, as governed by compo-
sitional rules. As such, standing meaning is entirely context-invariant,
remaining constant across all occasions of use.19
I think it is pretty clear that reference point information could not be
part of the standing meaning of an attribute frame. This is straightfor-
wardly demonstrated by the fact that reference point information is defea-
sible in a way that standing meaning is not. For example, an utterance of
(5) would be perfectly felicitous, despite the second clause explicitly
denying the reference point information associated with (1).
(5) The player missed 40% of his shots but that was a pretty low proportion.
In contrast, (6) is clearly contradictory because the standing meaning of
the second clause is incompatible with that of the first.
(6) The player missed 40% of his shots but he made 70% of them.
That said, there are more subtle hypotheses in the vicinity, which could
enable reference point information to be traced back to standing
meaning without needing to be invariant across all occasions of utterance.
In the next two subsections I consider, in turn, whether reference point
19As will be discussed below, semantics is often thought to involve the composition of at least some
occasion-specific elements, and thus may not be entirely invariant across contexts of use.
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information could arise from overt indexicality or the presence of covert
variables.
4.2. Overt indexicality
The first option to consider is that expressions like ‘full’, ‘empty’, ‘make’,
and ‘miss’ are broadly indexical, similarly to ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and a range of
others. What is distinctive about these expressions is that their standing
meanings include occasion-specific components, which allow them to
refer to different entities on different occasions.20 The standing meaning of
‘you’, for example, might be something like the speaker’s addressee, which
makes essential appeal to a particular individual in the utterance situation.
Occasion-sensitive expressions have standardly been taken to contribute
their referents to the semantic contents of uttered sentences that contain
them.21 So, for example, what ‘you’ contributes to the semantic content of
‘You missed!’, as uttered on a particular occasion, is the individual to whom
the utterance is addressed on that occasion.
I don’t think this kind of overtly indexical analysis will work for the
expressions we are interested in. Take, for example, the expression
‘miss’. If we were to capture reference point information by treating
‘miss’ as an occasion-sensitive expression, its standing meaning would
need to be something like ‘miss more than the reference point’. Recall,
though, that since standing meaning is indefeasible, ‘miss’ would have
to appeal to an occasion-specific reference point across all uses;22 in the
same way, ‘you’ always means the speaker’s addressee. This is implausible
for ‘miss’, as illustrated by a counterexample like (7):
(7) The player missed his shot because he was distracted by the flashing cameras.
I take it that there is no sense in which ‘missed’ in (7) appeals to a reference
point. Similar reasoning extends to other pairs of expressions substituted
across attribute frames.
4.3. Covert variables
Even if expressions like ‘full’, ‘empty’, ‘make’, and ‘miss’ are not themselves
occasion-sensitive, it remains possible that attribute frames, taken as
20I use ‘occasion-specific’ here, rather than the more familiar ‘context-dependent’ or ‘context-sensitive’, in
order to remain neutral on the question of whether the referents of indexicals are constitutively deter-
mined by the context or by speaker intentions. For further discussion of this issue see (Neale 2016).
21However, see (Harris forthcoming) for a different approach.
22Or, at least, all literal uses; a speaker might use ‘miss’ ironically or metaphorically but I will leave such
non-literal uses aside for now.
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complex expressions, do contain some sort of reference point parameter.
Here I draw specifically on an approach developed by Stanley and others
(King and Stanley 2005; Stanley 2002, 2005; Stanley and Szabo 2000).
These theorists posit covert variables in sentences’ logical forms, which
get saturated by occasion-specific values. Thus, for example, the under-
lying logical form of a sentence like (8) can be represented roughly as in
(8a), where ‘x’ acts as a placeholder for a contextually salient comparison
class (say, 14 year olds, or basketball players).
(8) John is tall.
(8a) John is tall considered relative to x.
Somewhat similarly to cases of overt indexicality, the sentence’s stand-
ing meaning is held to contain a variable in need of saturation (the
difference is just that the variable does not appear at the level of
lexical meaning but at the level of logical form). As before, then, the
sentence’s semantic content is standardly taken to depend on the com-
parison class, despite the fact that this will vary from occasion to
occasion. Imagine, for example, a conversation concerned with John
qua basketball player. An utterance of (8) in this context could be
analysed as follows:
(8b) John is tall for a basketball player.
On the view being discussed, this would count as its semantic content.
Applying the idea to a sentence like (2), we could characterise its logical
form as follows:
(2b) The player missed 40% of his shots, considered relative to x.
For each utterance of (2), the semantic content would then depend on the
value of the comparison class denoted by ‘x’ (which might be, say, all
shooting guards, NBA players, or residents of New York, depending on
the situation).
The problem with this analysis is that it does not yet explain why the
player should be thought of as having missed a large proportion of
shots relative to the relevant comparison class. To capture that, we
would need some additional restriction of the comparison class, requir-
ing it to be one that renders 40% a relatively large proportion of shots
to miss. The Stanley-style account provides no obvious motivation for
this further restriction. (Moreover, once we do add it – presumably
by appealing to the effects of the verb phrase – it is unclear
12 S. A. FISHER
whether that account would still have any substantive explanatory role
to play).23
5. Free effects
In the previous section I provided reasons for denying that reference
point information can be traced back to standing meanings. In this
section I consider how it might, instead, intrude freely on semantic
content.24 There are two components of this question: the first concerns
whether reference point information is a free effect, in the sense of its
being triggered not by standing meaning but by some wider factor(s). I
take it that it must be (and in §6 I will consider the possibility that the trig-
gering factor is a convention of language use). The second component
concerns whether reference point information affects semantic content
rather than some other kind of content. This raises more delicate issues.
The claim I am interested in exploring is that the contents directly commu-
nicated by utterances are (often or always) freely enriched, as contextual-
ists about meaning have argued (Bach 1994; Carston 2002; Recanati 2004,
2010; Sperber and Wilson 1995).25 26 It is important to note, though, that
on many contextualist accounts, such contents would not be described as
‘semantic’, precisely because they are freely enriched. Instead, the label
‘semantic’ is often reserved for something closer to standing meaning
(which, however, is often taken to be sub-propositional or theoretically
irrelevant). In contrast, the directly communicated content is described
variously as ‘what is said’ (Recanati 2004, 2010), ‘explicature’ (Carston
2002; Sperber and Wilson 1995), or ‘impliciture’ (Bach 1994).27 Given
these terminological choices, the notion of free intrusion on semantic
meaning risks becoming incoherent.
23There are other problems too: it may be difficult to explain the defeasibility of the reference point infor-
mation, as well as the intuition that attribute frames express completemeanings,with determinate truth-
values, independently of that information. For more fundamental criticisms of the wider strategy of
positing covert variables, see (Borg 2012; Collins 2007; Neale 2007; Recanati 2004).
24On an alternative relativist view, reference point information might be understood as freely affecting
truth-conditions without affecting content. For general arguments in favour of a relativist approach,
see (Lasersohn 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Predelli 2005). Although I will focus on a contextualism-inspired
analysis here, the same considerations would apply equally to a relativist version.
25I take ‘enrichment’ to include both the modulation of standing meanings of uttered expressions and the
addition of components that do not correspond to parts of the uttered sentence (so called ‘unarticulated
constituents’ [Perry and Blackburn 1986]).
26I will remain neutral throughout as to whether ‘directly communicated’ contents must be intended by
the speaker, inferred by the hearer, or both. I will also abstract away from debates about precisely
how directly communicated contents should be individuated and distinguished from indirectly commu-
nicated contents; I will work with a more intuitive distinction here. For further critical discussion, see
(Borg 2016).
27Note that this is ‘implic-i-ture’ with an ‘i’ not implic-a-ture with an ‘a’.
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On the other hand, as discussed above, semantics has standardly con-
cerned itself with complete truth-conditional contents that accord with
what speakers ‘express’, ‘say’, ‘assert’, or ‘directly communicate’ (I will
use these terms interchangeably here).28 On that understanding, contex-
tualists must be understood as allowing free effects on semantic contents.
Since my aim here is to consider, reasonably comprehensively, the various
possible senses in which reference point information might be considered
to have semantic implications, I want to allow for now the possibility that
directly communicated contents should count as semantic.29 The proposal
I am addressing, then, is one which would map the semantics-pragmatics
distinction to a distinction between two varieties of enriched meaning –
one that is directly communicated and another that is indirectly
communicated.
The first point to note, in assessing this proposal, is that there will often
be little motivation for analysing reference point information as directly
communicated anyway. Consider, for example, the following exchange:
A: How was Federico’s shooting last season?
B: He missed 40% of his shots.
I think B’s utterance conveys only indirectly that Federico missed a rela-
tively large proportion of his shots. Imagine, for example, that 40% is
actually well below the average proportion of shots missed. I don’t
believe there is any temptation at all to say B’s utterance would be
false, even if it constitutes a rather misleading way of describing the
player’s performance. If correct, this suggests that the reference point
information is not directly communicated in this exchange (nor in
many others like it).
That said, I want to allow that there could be cases in which reference
point information is directly communicated. This seems somewhat more
plausible, for example, in the following exchange:
C: How could they bench Federico?
D: He missed 40% of his shots.
Here we might gloss D’s utterance as communicating directly that Feder-
ico missed a relatively large proportion of his shots. After all, the utterance
28Even semantic minimalists, who drop the requirement for semantic contents to accord with what is intui-
tively said, still tend to think of semantic contents as needing to be complete, truth-conditional contents;
see, for example, (Borg 2012).
29However, I will end up using the case study of attribute framing to argue against this view in §7.
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can only be understood as constituting a relevant reply to C’s question if it
is being offered as an indirect explanation of why the player was benched;
and the explanation only makes sense once we assume that 40% rep-
resents a relatively large proportion of shots to miss. This content must
have been communicated already, and more directly.30
Given this gloss of the exchange above, we might characterise the
enriched content of D’s utterance as follows:
(9) He missed the relatively large proportion of 40% of his shots.31
Should we think of (9) as being the semantic content of D’s utterance of
‘He missed 40% of his shots’? In §7 I will return to this question and
argue that the case study of attribute framing speaks against such an
analysis. While I want to allow that, in principle, reference point infor-
mation could sometimes be classified as ‘semantic’ within the framework
under consideration, I will suggest that this classification cannot be motiv-
ated by the framing data, which instead supports a more minimal con-
ception of semantics.
For now, I simply note that treating reference point information as
semantic in cases where it is directly communicated, but as non-semantic
in cases where it is only indirectly communicated, would require appeal to
two separate mechanisms of meaning. The resulting account is therefore
prima facie less parsimonious than a univocal account, which treats refer-
ence point information as thoroughly non-semantic (though perhaps con-
veyable with greater or lesser strength, depending on wider considerations
like relevance).
In the next section I move on to consider an alternative approach, which
would treat all reference point information as semantic, on the basis of its
being conventional.
30It can be understood as resulting from the reinforcing effects of the speaker’s choice of frame and wider
considerations of relevance. Note how, in the following version of the exchange, D’s reply is less
felicitous:
C: How could they bench Federico?
D: He made 60% of his shots.
This is because considerations of frame and relevance pull in different directions, making it less clear that
D is saying that Federico missed a relatively large proportion of his shots. The point, then, is that refer-
ence point information could potentially be treated as semantic in some contexts, where it is reinforced
by wider factors.
31I formulate it in this way, with the reference point information modifying the proportion, in order to
ensure that it would meet certain criteria contextualists have proposed for directly communicated con-
tents. These include, for example, requirements for explicatures to be ‘developments’ or ‘expansions’ of




Some theories have sought to accommodate within semantics all kinds of
conventional linguistic phenomena (although these need not contribute
to truth-conditional content). On these views, the semantics-pragmatics
boundary lies at the interface between conventional and non-conven-
tional determinants of meaning. I will consider two possible conventional
determinants of reference point information: presupposition and ‘bias’.32
6.1. Presupposition
I will focus on presuppositions that are triggered linguistically.33 For illus-
tration, in sentence (10):
(10) Federico regrets missing the shot.
the expression, ‘regret’, triggers the following presupposition:
(10a) Federico missed the shot.
Although this is intuitively not part of what is asserted when (10) is uttered, it
is a precondition for the utterance being felicitous. Could attribute frames
trigger reference point information in a similar way?34 The idea would be
that (2), for example, presupposes (2a) (both reproduced below):35
(2) The player missed 40% of his shots.
(2a) The player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots.
I think further investigation shows such a presuppositional analysis to be
implausible. This is because the reference point information fails to exhibit
characteristic projection behaviour.36 Presuppositions typically persist
32Another view, developed by Lepore and Stone (2015), is that many ostensibly pragmatic phenomena are
actually the result of ambiguities between conventional meanings. I will not address the possibility that
attribute frames are simply ambiguous between interpretations which do or don’t include the reference
point information. I take this to be prima facie implausible (and further undermined by the asymmetrical
entailment relation that holds between the two contents).
33On some theories, presupposition is taken to be a pragmatic phenomenon (Simons 2006; Stalnaker
1999). However, I set these aside since they would not involve semantic intrusion in the sense being
discussed here.
34There is, after all, a precedent for such a view in the literature, since Ingram and Moxey (2011) explicitly
link their ‘presupposition denial’ account of negative natural language quantifiers (like ‘few’) to the
reference point hypothesis.
35Note that whereas the presupposition in (10a) is triggered by the simple expression ‘regret’, in attribute
framing cases any presupposition would have to attach to a more complex construction (like ‘missed
[some proportion of] his shots’). I will assume, though, that this need not be an insurmountable obstacle.
36The ease with which the information can be denied or defeated also provides some further support for
the same conclusion.
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when the asserted content is embedded in various syntactic environ-
ments, including negations, questions, possibility modals, and condi-
tionals. For example, the presupposed content in (10a) clearly continues
to project from (11) to (14):
(11) Federico doesn’t regret missing the shot.
(12) Does Federico regret missing the shot?
(13) Maybe Federico regrets missing the shot.
(14) If Federico regrets missing the shot, he’ll be motivated to keep practicing.
However, it is far less clear that the reference point information in (2a) pro-
jects from (15) to (18):
(15) The player didn’t miss 40% of his shots.
(16) Did the player miss 40% of his shots?
(17) Maybe the player missed 40% of his shots.
(18) If the player missed 40% of his shots, he’ll be motivated to keep practicing.37
Given the projection data, I think it is implausible that reference point
information itself is presupposed by attribute frames. Nevertheless, there
is something suggestive about a presuppositional analysis: specifically,
reference point information is often ‘backgrounded’ in a similar manner
as information that is presupposed.38 As McKenzie and others suggest,
attribute frames appear to ‘leak’ information about the wider utterance
context in a somehow underhand manner. In the next subsection I con-
sider a view that would capture this property in a slightly different way.39
37Note that the reference point information survives embedding within the antecedent of this conditional;
indeed, it grounds the explanatory connection between the antecedent and the consequent. However, it
does not project from the whole conditional, as (10a) does from (14). In other words, (18) does not entail
that the player did miss a relatively large proportion of his shots, whereas (14) does entail that Federico
missed the shot. Moreover, we should not assume that the persistence of the information within the
antecedent of a conditional is sufficient to demonstrate that the information is semantic rather than
pragmatic; for further discussion, see (Borg 2009) and (Davis 2016, §4.6).
38This point is further supported by the fact that reference point information seems to pass the ‘hey, wait a
minute’ test proposed by Von Fintel (2004) – or at least the ‘cautious assent’ test described by Predelli
(2013, 71). For example, one might felicitously respond to an utterance of (2) with ‘Hey, wait a minute,
40% is a small proportion to miss’; or, at least, ‘Yes, but 40% is a small proportion to miss’.
39In fact, though, I think it is ultimately best captured by noticing that the reference point information
presupposes the existence of a salient reference point (rather than the frame presupposing the reference
point information). For example, (2a) – ‘The player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots’ –
presupposes that there exists a salient reference point relative to which the player’s performance is
being judged. Therefore, wherever an attribute frame conveys reference point information, it might
be understood as indirectly presupposing the existence of a reference point.
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6.2. Bias
Predelli (2013) argues that some expressions have conventional ‘biases’,
which constrain the situations in which they may be used. To take one
of Predelli’s examples, the expression ‘hurray’ may only be used in situ-
ations in which (roughly speaking) the agent has a favourable attitude
towards the state of affairs being described. Conversely, ‘alas’ may only
be used where the agent has an unfavourable attitude.40 These constraints
are not taken to affect the truth or falsity of sentences in which the
expressions appear, like (19) and (20) below (borrowed from [Predelli
2013, 72–73]):
(19) Hurray, our frailty is the cause, not we.
(20) Alas, our frailty is the cause, not we.
Predelli takes (19) and (20) to be logically equivalent if used in the same
context. Their shared truth-conditional content is just that our frailty is
the cause, not we. However, due to their different (indeed opposing)
biases, they may only be uttered if the speaker is, respectively, happy or
unhappy about that fact.
Applying Predelli’s framework to attribute framing, let’s suppose that it is
conventional for speakers to select frames in accordancewith the reference
point hypothesis.41 In other words, it would be conventional for speakers to
use (1) where the player is believed to have made a relatively large pro-
portion of his shots, and (2) where the player is believed to have missed a
relatively large proportion42 Correspondingly, competent language users
who are sensitive to this convention can be expected to infer the reference
point information. In sum, the fact that (2) is uttered provides at least some
prima facie evidence that the situation is as described by (2a):
(2) The player missed 40% of his shots.
(2a) The player missed a relatively large proportion of his shots.
40In fact, the biases of ‘alas’ and ‘hurray’ are held to exhaust their meaning entirely; such expressions are
thus ‘purely biased’ (Predelli 2013, 67). In these examples, the relevant contextual parameter is the
speaker’s attitude. However, in principle, the parameters invoked by biases could correspond to all
kinds of contextual features.
41I will remain neutral on the question of whether the relevant convention would be a wholly arbitrary
convention of language use (just happening to be a characteristic of English and a range of other
languages), or whether it is linked to a more general human cognitive tendency to highlight what is
relatively abundant.
42Again, whereas the biases Predelli considers attach to relatively simple expressions (like ‘hurray’ and
‘alas’), in attribute framing cases they would have to attach to more complex constructions (see footnote
35 above).
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Note that the speaker’s use of (2) need not fully constrain the situation to
be this way (in contrast with sincere uses of ‘hurray’ and ‘alas’, which seem
to impose absolute requirements on the speaker’s attitude). Instead, the
reference point information is defeasible: it may be overridden by
counter-evidence (for example, if the hearer happened to know that the
average player actually missed 60%). Likewise, as discussed in §3, strictly
speaking we should think of reference point information as being made
more probable by the speaker’s use of frame, other things being equal,
rather than hearers always inferring it absolutely.
The same goes, however, for other cases Predelli presents as ‘biases’.
Take, for example, the co-extensional terms, ‘belly button’, ‘navel’, and
‘umbilicus’ (Predelli 2013, 81). These certainly tend to be usedwhen addres-
sing children, adults, andmedical professionals, respectively, and therefore
provide some indication of the identity of the addressee (as Predelli
suggests). However, it is still sensical (if less felicitous) to use them in addres-
sing different audiences. Perhaps, then, we can think of expressions’ biases
as affecting the probability of different situations obtaining, other things
being equal, rather than always requiring a particular situation to obtain.
In principle, this refinement could allow reference point information to
be accommodated as a ‘bias’ within Predelli’s expansive notion of seman-
tics. However, it is unclear what this would buy us. In particular, it is not
obvious that we need to appeal to ‘biases’ in order to explain how utter-
ances make it more or less probable that certain situations obtain. This
already falls out naturally from various pragmatic theories, including a
standard Gricean framework: for example, in one of Grice’s examples a
reviewer’s utterance of ‘Miss X produced a series of sounds that corre-
sponded closely with the score of “Home Sweet Home”’makes it probable
that her singing performance was poor (or, as Grice puts it ‘suffered from
some hideous defect’ [Grice 1989, 37]). In the final section of the paper, I
will suggest that the case study of attribute framing speaks more generally
against the inclusion of ‘biases’ within semantics.43
7. The semantics-pragmatics divide
To summarise the preceding discussion, I argued in §4 that the reference
point information conveyed by attribute frames cannot be traced back to
standing meaning. However, I acknowledged that it could potentially be
43Indeed, I believe that the reference point information conveyed by attribute frames may be analysable
similarly to the example from Grice, as a Manner-based implicature. However, this is not something I will
attempt to argue for here.
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considered broadly ‘semantic’ in two other respects. First, as discussed in
§5, reference point information might be held to intrude on what is directly
communicated. Second, assuming reference point information depends on
a conventional aspect of language use, it might be analysed as a semantic
‘bias’, as discussed in §6. In this final section, I will suggest that the case
study of framing in fact supports a narrower conception of semantics. I
will not offer a knock-down argument against the more expansive alterna-
tives. My point will be that, whatever other motivations for these views
exist, the framing data provide no additional support for widening the
scope of semantics.
Recall that the puzzle we face with respect to attribute framing effects is
to explain why pairs of frames, which predicate the same property of an
entity, generate systematically different judgements among hearers. The
solution offered by the reference point hypothesis appeals to the opposing
information alternative frames convey about the entity’s relation to a refer-
ence point. Yet, as we saw, reference point information cannot be traced
back to standing meaning; at that level, alternative frames remain equival-
ent. Instead, reference point information arises fromhow frames are used. In
other words, the reference point hypothesis depends on a distinction being
drawn between attribute frames’ standing meanings and what they com-
municate on particular occasions of use. Indeed, framing effects are
especially puzzling because both of those meanings can be present simul-
taneously, pulling us in two directions at once. Given this analysis, an
obvious way of bringing the semantics-pragmatics distinction to bear on
the phenomenon of framing would be to map it to the distinction
between standing sentence meaning and enriched communicated
meaning. That would result in our adopting a relativelyminimal conception
of semantics, as being restricted to the standing meanings of simple and
complex expressions. On that basis, we can explain how pairs of attribute
frames express equivalent semantic meanings at the same time as pragma-
tically conveying divergent reference point information.
In contrast, opting for a broad conception of semantics would result in
the distinction between reference point information and standing
meaning being obscured, in one of two ways. First, if semantics were
understood as capturing what a speaker intuitively ‘says’ we would end
up lumping together aspects of meaning arising from standing meanings
with aspects which depend on contextual factors. Alternatively, if seman-
tics were held to capture all conventional effects, we would end up
lumping together the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions
with how they are conventionally used. Drawing the semantics-pragmatics
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boundary in either of these ways risks concealing the distinction that is of
primary importance in explaining framing effects – namely, the distinction
between sentences’ standingmeanings (which are fixed and absolute) and
patterns of language use (which are defeasible and probabilistic).44
In fact, I suggest that the phenomenon of attribute framing represents a
clear empirical application for the semantics-pragmatics divide and, as
such, gives that conceptual distinction a valuable explanatory role. This
brings us to amore general point. The question ofwhere to locate the bound-
ary between semantics and pragmatics might at first appear to be a purely
terminological one. However, I believe this appearance obscures a substan-
tive debate. After all, if our conceptions of semantics and pragmatics are to
have genuine explanatory value, they must track real-world psychological
or sociological phenomena. I suggest, then, that the empirical case study of
framing effects can be used to inform the conceptual distinction between
semanticsandpragmatics– inparticular, bydemonstrating thevalueof a rela-
tively minimal notion of semantics, to be held apart from a range of wider
pragmatic effects on utterance interpretation. Since the proposed distinction
between standing sentencemeaning and enriched communicatedmeaning
also tracks key aspects of howphilosophers have traditionally understood the
difference between semantics and pragmatics (the former being constant
and fixed by linguistic rules, while the latter is fluid and freely affected by
the vagaries of human interaction) this seems like a good result.
In closing, it must of course be recognised that the case study of
framing furnishes us with only one piece of evidence for a minimal con-
ception of semantics. There are undoubtedly many other applications
for the concepts of semantics and pragmatics. Therefore, it could be
that consideration of these other purposes might ultimately favour a
different, potentially more expansive, conception. That said, I hope at
least to have indicated how further philosophical investigation of empiri-
cal phenomena like framing effects can fruitfully inform our conceptual
distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
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